<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Trust on FindPicked</title><link>https://findpicked.com/tags/trust/</link><description>Recent content in Trust on FindPicked</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://findpicked.com/tags/trust/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>MCP Trust Boundaries: Vet Tools, Prompts, and Actions</title><link>https://findpicked.com/blog/mcp-trust-boundaries-for-ai-agents/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://findpicked.com/blog/mcp-trust-boundaries-for-ai-agents/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;MCP trust boundaries&lt;/strong&gt; are the rules that define what an AI model, tool server, agent runtime, and human operator are allowed to see, decide, and do. In practice, securing MCP-based workflows means treating &lt;strong&gt;tool descriptions, prompts, retrieved content, and actions as separate trust zones&lt;/strong&gt;—then validating every handoff between them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That matters more now because AI systems are increasingly moving from “read and summarize” to “plan and act.” In &lt;strong&gt;MCP&lt;/strong&gt; and coding-agent environments, the dangerous failures are rarely exotic: a poisoned tool description, an untrusted prompt fragment, an overpowered action, or a missing human approval step can be enough to turn a useful assistant into an unsafe automator.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>